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It is a pleasure to comment on this fine paper, which 
combines a clever theoretical model of the caliber of work we associate 
with Ken Kletzer and a careful extension of the ongoing empirical research 
of Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody. The paper describes the debate 
over collective action clauses, which have been considered by the G-7, 
G-10, G-20, G-22, G-30, Institute of International Finance (IIF), International 
Monetary Fund, International Monetary and Financial Committee 
(IMFC), Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), Emerging Markets Credit 
Association (EMCA), a variety of finance ministries, and others no doubt— 
although not, to my knowledge, the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). For 
those who have not received a merit badge in the language of international 
bureaucrats, collective action clauses allow a specified majority of bondholders 
to represent the interests of the totality of issuers in renegotiations 
with the issuer. I argue that: 
—the basic premise of the debate on CACs lacks the appropriate historical 
perspective; 
—particulars of some of the arguments are not convincing; 
—and the only reasonable answer when the market is evolving is time   2
will tell. 
To make these arguments convincing, I split my comments into two 
parts. The first part addresses the big picture, which is necessary to understand 
the accumulation of debt in emerging markets and applies to almost 
all of the recent work on the international financial architecture. The second 
will consider seven specific issues about the Eichengreen-Kletzer-Mody 
(EKM) paper. 
Virtually every international economist would agree that one of the 
major unanswered questions in the field is why capital does not flow from 
rich to poor countries. That, of course, is the title of a famous paper by 
Robert Lucas,
1 which is why it is called the Lucas paradox.
2 In attempting 
to fashion a practical resolution to the Lucas paradox, advocates of CACs 
have often relied on the following chain of logic: 
3 
—Since capital flows are insufficient to pull up the capital stock of 
emerging market economies to industrial standards, 
—it must be the case that emerging market economies borrow too little. 
—Therefore mechanisms must be found to let them take on more debt. 
—Among those mechanisms encouraging debt issuance are CACs. 
—Therefore CACs are useful. 
The problem is that the second premise is a non sequitur. As shown by 
Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, emerging market economies do not borrow 
too little, they borrow too much.
4 A significant fraction of countries are 
debt intolerant because their weak political systems, unequal income distributions,   3
inconsistent rules of law, and narrow tax bases imply that they cannot 
reliably service debt. For a country with such problems, to borrow is 
ultimately to default. If a significant fraction of emerging market economies 
is debt intolerant, efforts to make it easier to borrow will end in tears 
because making it easier to borrow will make it easier to default. Moreover, 
such an emphasis on borrowing will distract from more important (and lasting) 
mechanisms of fostering direct investment in countries where rates of 
return should be very high. Making progress on that front is a harder job of 
improving the legal and political infrastructure of the country and making 
balance sheets more transparent. That job will not be done quickly and will 
only prove itself useful over time. 
Abstracting from this larger issue of what CACs can or cannot deliver, 
EKM provide a helpful discussion of the mechanics, theory, and practice of 
CACs. Their discussion of how the development of the CAC debate 
evolved is a must read for those interested in the politics of international 
financial architecture. My specific comments are directed as much to the 
authors’ current work as to their efforts in the future and those of other 
researchers. 
Foremost it is important to remember that history matters. In their section 
on the evolution of the debate, EKM push the discussion of the problems of 
sovereign default back to 1981. In fact, between 1500 and 1900, Spain 
defaulted thirteen times. In the period between 1500 and 1800, France 
defaulted every thirty years or so. And Mexico has been in a state of default   4
about one-half of the years since 1824, while Brazil has been in default 
about one-quarter of those years.
5 Why should we think that a problem that 
has existed for five centuries across several continents can be solved by the 
stroke of a pen? 
This suggests that officials may want to be humble in their ambitions. 
Some problems may be too big and too basic for the international community 
to solve. EKM quote Stanley Fischer as saying “when a country’s debt 
burden is unsustainable, the international community—operating through 
the IMF—faces the choice of lending to it or forcing it into a potentially 
extremely costly restructuring, whose outcome is unknown.” I would suggest 
that we remember Herb Stein’s theorem: anything that cannot go on 
forever will end. If debt is unsustainable, bookkeeping does not alter that 
reality. Real resources will have to shift in a manner that the original contractors 
had not completely anticipated. 
There is a slippery slope when direction to the market place comes from 
above by government officials rather than developed within the private sector. 
The painful reality is that regulations and codes of conduct lag privatesector 
initiative. For instance, as EKM note, CACs cannot help when there 
are multiple issues that lead to an aggregation problem. One relevant example 
of that problem is Argentina, which has more than eighty bonds outstanding. 
In such circumstances there is no simple fix. Among the solutions 
mentioned by EKM are, first, incorporating into bond contracts two-step 
CACs that aggregate before moving to majority rule and, second, arm twisting   5
investment banks. As the number and variety of issuers expand over 
time, may it become the reality that the international community will ultimately 
arrive at suggesting tango clauses that involve ten or fifteen steps in 
the debt resolution process? 
But is one, in fact, not looking forward but looking back? One has to 
wonder whether the focus on CACs is not fixing the last crisis. As they 
themselves note, EKM are looking at mechanisms that help mitigate external 
debt crises of the type that did not apply to Mexico in 1994, Korea and 
Indonesia in 1997, and Russia in 1998. Again, as the number and variety of 
issuers expand over time, where will the line be drawn, or will lines be 
drawn everywhere—in international and domestic as well as public and 
private-sector debt contracts? 
Perhaps I am pessimistic by nature, but I was struck when EKM noted 
that “it is unlikely that we will see more countries incurring large amounts 
of short-term foreign-currency indexed or denominated debt by issuing 
ninety-day dollar-linked notes (like Mexico in 1994) or allowing their banks 
to borrow ninety-day money offshore in dollars (as in Thailand and South 
Korea). Borrowers and regulators better appreciate the special risks of 
short-term funding and advantages of medium- and long-term bonds.” The 
fact is that economists like to say that investors learn over time, but the evidence 
does not support that assertion. 
6 
There is a question that goes unanswered in the paper. Indeed it is a 
question that all the work on collective action clauses must address: why   6
are CACs not included voluntarily in debt issued in New York despite their 
inclusion in London offerings? EKM’s hypothesis is that New York 
lawyers lack the practice with this profitable clause, even though their partners 
abroad regularly employ it. Another way of phrasing this hypothesis is 
that major securities law firms in New York must not have access to e-mail. 
Might there not be something deeper at work than an information 
imperfection? 
As with any paper that melds theoretical and empirical work by multiple 
authors, it is an open issue whether the model and regressions fit together. In 
particular EMK estimate regressions using a standard vector of explanatory 
variables, which includes for each debt instrument the maturity, fixed versus 
floating, characteristics of the issuer, volatility of exports and other 
macrovariables of the domicile of the issuer, and conditions in emerging 
markets generally. The problem is that most of these variables are endogenous 
in the theoretical model. In that sense their regressions should be 
thought of as providing helpful stylized facts that aid in interpreting the 
model rather than a strict test of a well-defined hypothesis. 
In conclusion, this is an important paper that addresses an issue that has 
been at the forefront of the discussion of the international financial architecture. 
The authors’ empirical finding, that CACs lead to tighter interest rate 
spreads for countries that enjoy relatively higher credit ratings but do the 
opposite for those countries with a weaker track record, is thought provoking— 
as it implies that CACs may lead to greater discrimination on the part   7
of investors. 
But the fact that officials and staff of finance ministries and international 
financial institutions have been so focused on CACs may be an implicit criticism 
of the net contribution of the work on the international financial architecture. 
When I am asked about CACs, I usually give a simple answer: any 
argument that relies on international securities lawyers to promote a welfare- 
improving change must be overstated. At this writing, it is impossible 
to generalize from the very limited experience with sovereigns issuing collective 
action clauses. More important, worrying about effects measured in 
basis points with sizable standard errors misses the larger point—emerging 
market economies borrowed too much, not too little, and helping them to 
borrow more may not be helping them. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Reprinted in Lucas (2002). 
2. This idea was actually modeled in an earlier paper by Gertler and Rogoff (1990). 
3. EKM are more careful than most to avoid this simplistic line of reasoning. 
4. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003). 
5. Reinhart and others (2003). 
6. See Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2003).   8
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